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MARCH 1964

AN INQUIRY INTO THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK, *The Sharpness of the Dagger*

After Diem and the Bay of Pigs,
after Mossadegh and Arbenz,
we must recognize the CIA
for what it is—and control it, says
this outspoken Congressman

by Rep. John V. Lindsay

Two major reversals in our foreign policy within the last three years have shaken the poise of the Intelligence branch of the United States government to its underpinnings: the abortive adventure at the Bay of Pigs, and the blinding miasma of United States policy that arose in South Vietnam during the Diem era.

The immediate dangers past, commentators have sought to unravel the confusing web of influences in both situations. The full truth is not yet known, and may never be. Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that in both cases the three principal instruments of U.S. foreign policy—the State Department, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency—were at crucial times pulling in separate directions.

The criticism most frequently heard is that the C.I.A. was meddling in policy, undertaking functions that were not its proper responsibility. The charge has been made that the C.I.A. was combining Intelligence gathering with active "operations," a course which carries the risk that Intelligence may be used to support prior operational decisions. It has been alleged over and over that in Vietnam, as in the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A., with or without direction from higher authority, became enmeshed in its own intrigues. In the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A. was found supporting a collection of Batista refugees, apparently without clear direction from the State Department. In Vietnam, it became clear that the C.I.A. was closely aligned with and subsidizing the Special Forces run by the late Ngo Dinh Nhu, an elite military force that raided the Buddhist pagodas. Responsible representatives of the press have reported strong disagreements between the State Department and the C.I.A. with regard to policy in Vietnam, and these reports must stand even beside the exaggerations of less-responsible press accounts.

Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000500090005-1
The evidence was overwhelming that U.S. policy was confused and
that the divisions within agencies were being hung on the public Continued

wash line. When later our government's support swung to the insurgents who ousted Diem, this very possibly meant an about-face on the part of the C.I.A. The extent of our involvement even then is unknown, but that we were involved must seem quite possible.

Almost every qualified outsider who has examined the history of the Bay of Pigs blunder has concluded that it was founded on a haphazard jumble of foreign policy, Intelligence gathering, and military operations. The C.I.A. appears to have organized and conducted the attempt and also to have gathered the Intelligence data on which the prospects for the attempt were judged. Not only was C.I.A. shaping policy—perhaps understandable because of the absence of direction from policy-making organs of the government—but that policy was patently at odds with State Department thinking. Without fully rehearsing the baleful events that preceded the Bay of Pigs, it is perfectly clear, to underestimate the matter, that the President was badly served by the agencies involved.

These premises, like all of my remarks in this article, arise only from material and information available to the public. In respect to such material and information I am in the same position as other representatives of the people in Congress, with very few exceptions. All the more reason for such a representative to speak out.

To state the danger posed by the intermingling of Intelligence gathering and operations is not to say it is unrecognized by responsible officials. Able men throughout the Intelligence community are well aware of and deeply concerned by dangers arising from the absence of clear distinction between Intelligence gathering and operations. The trouble may often start, as Allen Dulles, the distinguished former head of the C.I.A. recently said, from lack of clear-cut operational policy in Washington. When a policy vacuum occurs, men in the field are almost involuntarily propelled into operational activities which are not their proper responsibility. Sherman Kent, the head of the Board of National Estimates—one of the most influential elements of the Intelligence community—makes the point this way:

"Almost any man or group of men confronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under duress, it is a snap judgment off the top of the head. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, Intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst."

The failures of C.I.A. covert operations are well-known. Less well-known, and of equally sobering magnitude, are the successes. The C.I.A., for example, played a key part in the ousting of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953, paving the way for eventual reform of the pro-Western government of the Shah. Both British and American vital interests had been threatened by the capricious Mossadegh policies, the major threat being to Britain's necessary supply of oil. The successful coup which unseated Mossadegh was of great benefit to the United States and the West.

The following year the virulently anti-American Arbenz regime in Guatemala was overthrown. The C.I.A. was widely believed to have engineered the coup. But for the success of that coup, Soviet-directed communism in Latin America would presumably be far more deeply entrenched than it is today.

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Each of these episodes demonstrates, for good or ill, the explosive nature of the C.I.A.'s operational involvement in international politics. It is not at all improbable that it will be similarly involved in the future. The cold war will be with us for a very long time; so will the C.I.A. Accordingly, our democratic government, unused to secrecy, has within it an immensely powerful and extremely expensive secret organization, for the past few years housed in a very large permanent building on the banks of the Potomac. That building represents the institutionalization of the C.I.A. in the government establishment. More exactly, it marks its positive elevation in status, always important in government. And yet there is no effective check on its activities now. And there was none in 1961.

Few can deny the actual and potential power of the C.I.A., however carefully it may be held in check by the skillful men who run it. Ours is supposed to be a government of laws, not of men. At stake are questions of war and peace, as the two Cuban crises so clearly demonstrated. All of us at that time took a look into the atomic pit. Decisions can be made at such times and actions taken about which the public is totally in the dark. So be it. As much as we may abhor government by secrecy, as much as it threatens fundamental liberties, we must understand its limited and necessary application in particular circumstances of hot or cold war. Nevertheless, crucial decisions are made for us and in our name of which we know nothing. And all too often secrecy which is necessary breeds secrecy which is unnecessary, at which point the danger becomes nothing less than a threat to democratic institutions, a marginal one at the outset, but potentially a most serious one.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred despite efforts by Secretary of State Christian Herter and C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles to sort out the relations between their two agencies so that the making of foreign policy would be removed from the C.I.A., and the command of policy kept firmly in the hands of ambassadors in the field at all times. The Herter-Dulles agreement was reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk. More recently, following events in Vietnam during the Diem regime, the President found it necessary to reassert publicly his authority and that of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council over the Intelligence community. Collaterally the Secretary of State sought to assure the primacy of ambassadors in the policy area overseas.

Particular persons and particular situations may seem to define problems of this sort. But it is also the case that, as long as both the State Department and the C.I.A. are responsible for the collection of information, and—perhaps most important—as long as C.I.A. continues to be responsible for "special operations"—the support of anti-Communist elements and the fomenting of opposition to hostile governments—the problem of integrating the Central Intelligence Agency into our general foreign-policy apparatus will continue to grow in scope and potential danger.

For a time the Maxwell Taylor committee, appointed by the President to inquire particularly into the Cuban question, appears to have considered the possibility of transferring the bulk of C.I.A.'s Special Operations to the Defense Department. But this solution would have had the obvious disadvantage of ensuring that the uniformed military—and hence the authority and prestige of the U.S. government—would be identified with any paramilitary operation as soon as it became a matter of public knowledge.

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In any event, it seems that the Taylor Committee has left routine covert operations in the hands of the C.I.A., with control to be transferred to the Pentagon only if a particular project becomes so big as to warrant open military participation. Mr. Hanson Baldwin in *The New York Times* summed up the matter thus:

"The general rule of thumb for the future is that the C.I.A. will not handle any primarily military operations, or ones of such size that they cannot be kept secret. However, each case will apparently be judged on its merits; there is no hard-and-fast formula that will put one operation under the C.I.A. and another under the Pentagon."

Now surely this is an area in which neither hard-and-fast formulas nor organizational gimmicks can solve the major difficulties. Much depends on the particular situations. The people who are in the most favorable position to gather information are sometimes the best equipped to engage in clandestine political activities. But largely because the problem eludes organizational formulas, because it is a problem to which there is no simple solution, it must be recognized as such and held in check as much as possible. Problems unwatched and unattended tend to multiply.

C.I.A. is served by only one politically responsible officer: the Director himself. All others are career officials. In comparison, the President keeps ultimate control in the Pentagon by his political power to appoint all the top civilian officers there. These officials are entrusted with clear political responsibility, for which there is no parallel in the C.I.A.

There are in fact questions repeatedly raised about the C.I.A. Is it wise, for example, to rely to the extent the C.I.A. seems to on the services of retired military officers? One would suppose that retired service officers, though almost always men of great ability, would have an instinctive tendency to take a rather narrow, strictly "operational" and "efficient" view of the problems confronting them. I hope I will not be misunderstood. C.I.A. officials are among the most distinguished in the entire federal establishment. The leadership of the agency comprises men of great gifts and dedication—and I include the former military men in the agency. But recruitment of high-caliber men in large numbers is a problem in the federal government, especially in agencies whose work is international.

It is also fair to ask whether the C.I.A. should rely heavily on the services of political refugees. It seems reasonable to suppose, for example, that an exile from his homeland, especially one who has passionate convictions about the course of events there, may not be the best person to assess these events. Again, I hope that I will not be misunderstood. I do not mean to impugn in the slightest the enormous amount of valuable work done by exiles and refugees in the C.I.A. Without their help, as in the case of the ex-military men, the organization simply could not function as it should. Neither do I mean to suggest that C.I.A. should be staffed with "soft-liners" or people who have had no personal experience with the countries in question. That would be absurd. But I do think that by every recommendation of common sense we must be certain of the *objectivity and breadth of our Intelligence*.

This raises the question of the structure of the Intelligence community and of Intelligence evaluation—the question of how best to organize the interpreting of the enormous amount of material collected daily by all agencies of the Intelligence community.

The phrase "Intelligence community" embraces the numerous agencies within the executive branch which are concerned with Intelligence collection and evaluation: the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

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Research, the Intelligence branches of the Armed Services, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and others. The daily chore of coordinating and cross-checking daily Intelligence data is largely in the hands of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The long-range estimates are prepared under the direction of the Board of National Estimates, which presides as a kind of general planning staff for the Intelligence community. Estimates prepared by this group are submitted to a committee known as the U.S. Intelligence Board. If the Board of Estimates is the planning board for the community, the Intelligence Board is its board of directors. It is the final forum for the professional Intelligence community; its judgments go to the National Security Council.

Two aspects of this system in particular are worth noting. The first is the preeminence of the Central Intelligence Agency. A high proportion of the Intelligence community's fact gathering is done by C.I.A. The Board of National Estimates functions as a part of C.I.A. The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board is the Director of the C.I.A. And the Intelligence community's spokesman on the National Security Council itself is that same C.I.A. Director.

The second aspect worth noting is the duality of C.I.A.'s role. Under the National Security Act this agency is not only one participant in the Intelligence community; it is also the chief agency responsible for coordinating it. In other words, at many points in the process of evaluation, C.I.A. is both player and umpire, both witness and judge. This ambiguity is implicit in the title of the Director, who is formally not the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency," but simply "Director of Central Intelligence."

The problem this raises is clear. It is that the Central Intelligence Agency, being not merely central but *dominant* in the Intelligence community, is in an extraordinary position, so long as it is left unchecked to carry its special institutional tendencies into the shaping of American foreign policy.

I believe that these difficulties of unchecked power in the Intelligence community can be alleviated only by the Congress, which has the Constitutional responsibility to oversee the functions of the executive branch on behalf of the American people. Therefore, I propose the establishment in the Congress of a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence. I propose that such a committee be constituted along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and that it have its own funds and staff. It should continuously inquire into our foreign information and Intelligence programs, including: (1) the relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department, especially overseas; (2) the relations between Intelligence gathering on the one hand and so-called Special Operations on the other; (3) the selection and training of Intelligence personnel; and (4) the whole question of Intelligence evaluation.

The proposal of a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence is not new. In one form or another it has been introduced into the House in each of the last ten sessions, though it has not been debated on the Floor. In the Senate, a bill to establish a Joint Committee, sponsored by Senator Mansfield in 1956, was debated for two days on the Floor of the Senate and defeated.

Nor is the proposal partisan. At time of writing, there are fourteen Democratic and five Republican sponsors in the House. In 1959 resolutions were sponsored in the House by twelve Democrats and five Republicans. In the Senate in 1956, members on both sides of the aisle voted for Senator Mansfield's resolution—including the then Junior Senator from Massachusetts, the late President Kennedy.

It is most often argued against the establishment of a "watchdog" committee that the secrecy of our Intelligence system would be endangered. The argument does not stand up. No one denies that the C.I.A. and the other Intelligence agencies must conduct a very high proportion of their work in secret; secrecy is of the essence in their work. But what is true of the Intelligence community is also true in many other areas of government—in the fields of atomic energy, weapons development, and, in some respects, foreign policy. But does this mean that Congress is to have no effective authority in those areas? Of course it does not, for Congress has such authority. It has always asserted its right, indeed its Constitutional duty, to oversee even the most sensitive areas of Government. And where matters of the highest secrecy have been involved, Members of both Houses have shown themselves capable of exercising the utmost restraint. This was never more clearly demonstrated than during the Manhattan Project in World War II, when members of the two appropriations committees were kept apprised of work on the atomic bomb without breaking security. The record of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in this connection has been impeccable.

Moreover, the C.I.A. is even now monitored, *in theory*, by four small subcommittees of the committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and House. Not even the most experienced and security-conscious officials in the Intelligence community would deny these subcommittees—had they time to apply for it—access to the pertinent information that might enable them conscientiously to provide the vast sums of money that are requested year after year. But apparently the notion exists that if the whole matter is kept on the lowest possible level of Congressional concern, secrecy will receive a higher degree of respect. There is no logic in the notion. I should think just the opposite would be true.

I find myself in even less sympathy with another argument advanced frequently in discussions of this question—namely, that the Intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council, and that therefore we in the Congress have no right to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. But clearly the executive and legislative branches of our government are not watertight compartments separated by steel bulkheads; the material between them is flexible and porous. There are any number of Congressional Committees which keep a watch over the executive agencies. And, as I have already said, it is not only their right to do so; it is their duty under the Constitution.

These arguments concerning secrecy and the exclusively executive nature of the Intelligence function are, though unconvincing, at least consistent. But strangely enough, those who oppose the idea of a Joint Committee insist as well that Congressional surveillance is already more than adequate. This contention was made by Allen Dulles in his recent book and by President Kennedy in answer to a question at his October 9 press conference.

What, in fact, is the present extent of Congressional surveillance over Intelligence activities? As mentioned, in both the House and Senate the bodies responsible for overseeing the Intelligence community are subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services committees. Neither the House Foreign-Affairs Committee nor the Senate Foreign-Relations Committee has jurisdiction in this area despite their obvious interest in Intelligence matters. This might not matter were it not that the surveillance exercised by the four existing subcommittees is both cursory and sporadic.

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At the time I introduced the resolution proposing the Joint Committee and spoke on the floor of the House in favor of it, Congressman Walter Norblad of Oregon, the second-ranking Minority member of the House Committee on Armed Services, had this to say:

"Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks. I think we should have had a joint committee to monitor the C.I.A. when it was first established. I have had a little experience in the matter as a Member of the Committee on Armed Services. As you may know, we have a subcommittee on the C.I.A. I was a member of that committee for four years. We met annually—one time a year, for a period of two hours in which we accomplished virtually nothing. I think a proposal such as [Mr. Lindsay has] made is the answer to it because a part-time subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, as I say, which meets for just two hours, one day a year, accomplishes nothing whatsoever. I want to compliment the gentleman on his proposal."

The reasons for the lack of adequate check and examination are almost self-evident: the members of the four subcommittees themselves, by definition, have relatively low status. But even had those subcommittees both status and time, the difficulties involved in dividing jurisdiction among the four would, I think, be insuperable.

It should be clear from what I have said that the bipartisan proponents of a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence are fully aware that a high degree of secrecy is essential to the workings of the Intelligence community. Neither I nor any legislator wishes to see the legitimate secrets of the Intelligence community reported in the press and on the air. Indeed, this seems far more likely to occur under present conditions because the press, sometimes called "the fourth branch of the government," may turn out to be the only effective check on Intelligence activities—and that check could be dangerous as well as disruptive. But danger and disruption are certain if public confidence in the Intelligence establishment erodes. It is less likely if a body of the people's representatives, properly constituted and carefully chosen by the leadership of the two Houses of Congress, remains continuously aware of the activities of the Intelligence community. The performance of this function is nothing less than their duty to the American people, whose lives and liberties are profoundly involved in the Intelligence activities of our government.

Finally, I would observe that such a joint Congressional Committee would perform a useful, perhaps an indispensable, service for the Intelligence community itself. There has been a tendency to assign the burden of blame to the C.I.A. when some foreign undertakings have gone bad or failed altogether. Whether the blame has been justified—as in some cases it may have been—or whether unjustified, the liability to blame is apparent, and the C.I.A., unlike other less inhibited agencies, can do little to defend itself. A joint committee could do much to maintain the record fairly.

As the central government grows in size and power, and as the Congress, like parliaments everywhere, tends to diminish in importance, the need for countervailing checks and balances becomes all the more important. The shaping and implementation by secret processes of some part of foreign policy is an extremely serious matter in a free society. It cannot be shrugged off or stamped as an inescapable necessity because of the dangers of the time and the threat from present enemies of democracy. To do so is to deny our history and to gamble dangerously with our future. There are internal as well as external dangers. Free political systems and individual liberties can be swiftly undermined. Confidence in the systems and liberties themselves can be lost even more swiftly. And when that happens to a free society, no foreign policy, however well conceived, will protect its highest interest, the continuation of

SATURDAY EVENING
POST

FEB 15 1964

Hogwash about the CIA



CIA's McCone

WASHINGTON: In all fairness, it is time somebody had a kind word to say for the poor old Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA is rather like the boy in school who always gets slapped around because everybody knows he won't hit back.

The State Department has slapped the CIA hard for "invading the policy-making field," on the grounds that the agency briefed some newspapermen on the sad state of the Soviet economy. A lot of the press has also been slapping the CIA around, and a few highly respectable journals have even half-echoed the Communist *Worker's* charge that Lee Harvey Oswald, murderer of President Kennedy, went to the Soviet Union in 1959 as a CIA hireling.

Former President Harry Truman has got in his licks. "I never had any thought when I set up CIA," he has written, "that it would be injected into the peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." Sen. Eugene McCarthy, in an article recently published in this magazine [Jan. 4-11], has charged that the CIA is getting out of hand. Neither the President nor the Congress, the senator maintains, really controls the agency or knows what it is up to.

Somebody certainly blundered when the CIA held a mass press conference on the Soviet economy, and let reporters name the agency as their source. But with all due respect to a former President and an able senator, the other charges against CIA are a lot of hogwash. Let us consider them, in order.

First, Lee Harvey Oswald never at any time had any connection whatever with CIA, although suspicions on that score are perhaps natural in view of the mystery surrounding Oswald's travels and his sources of income. The highest officials of the CIA are ready to so testify—and indignantly—before the Warren Commission investigating the murder. "If anybody in the CIA had hired so obvious a psychotic," says one of the greatest experts in the intelligence business, "he should have been fired on the spot."

Second, the odd fact is that Harry S. Truman himself put the CIA into the "peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." The CIA's operational, or cloak-and-dagger, unit was established by President Truman's National Security Council in the summer of 1948, after the Communists grabbed Czechoslovakia. In the subsequent four and a half years, before President Truman stepped down, certain highly effective secret operations were mounted with the President's full knowledge and approval.

Third, the notion that neither Congress nor the President controls the agency or knows what it is doing is nonsense. The CIA is unquestionably the most supervised agency in the Government—dozens of people spend much of their time breathing down its neck.

The neck-breathers include four subcommittees of Congress, headed by Representatives Carl Vinson and Clarence Cannon and Senators Richard Russell and Carl Hayden. These congressional grandees are acutely jealous of congressional prerogatives, and they are not about to let any executive agency, in Senator McCarthy's words, "[decide] for itself just how much or how little Congress ought to know."

Neither CIA director John McCone nor his predecessor, Allen Dulles, when meeting in closed session, ever refused a candid answer to any question. To cite one example, contrary to the popular mythology, the four subcommittees were thoroughly briefed on the U-2 operation virtually from its inception.

By the same token, ever since Mr. Truman established the operational section, every President has been thoroughly informed of every important secret operation. And every President has had, and sometimes exercised, an absolute veto power over any operation. When there have been disputes on major policy matters between the CIA and the State Department or the Pentagon, the last word in the argument has always been the President's. Again contrary to the popular mythology, President Eisenhower personally authorized the U-2 flight which Khrushchev used to break up the 1960 summit meeting.

Moreover, the President has plenty of help in keeping an eye on the agency. For example, a blue-ribbon presidential board, headed by former White House counsel Clark Clifford, is charged with continuous supervision of the agency. And there are all sorts of special committees, like that headed by Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, with responsibility in the field of subversion and guerrilla warfare.

It is just plain silly, in short, to suppose that the CIA is "a law unto itself." The real danger is that the CIA will become a vast cautious bureaucracy, bound by the lowest common denominator of timidity among its innumerable supervisors. The CIA in any case spends less than a third of the money and "owns" less than a quarter of the people in the intelligence business. The Pentagon intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, spend most of the money and own most of the people, but nobody seems interested in supervising them.

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Harry S. Truman



Sen. Eugene McCarthy

The NSA particularly could do with a bit of supervision. It has a horrible security record. Recent cases include a couple of homosexuals who defected to the Soviet Union and spilled all the beans; and an Army sergeant who collected \$50,000 from Russian agents for really important American secrets, and spent the loot in the most conspicuous possible way on mistresses, motor yachts and the like. If the CIA had been responsible for either case, there would have been a hullabaloo to make the Alger Hiss case seem tame.

In fact, the CIA has not yet suffered a single known defection or penetration, which is better than par for the course. Certainly there are time-servers in the agency, and certainly it has had its failures, in the Bay of Pigs and elsewhere.

But those who enjoy slapping the CIA around ought to ask themselves what might have happened if Mr. Truman had not been wise enough to put CIA into "the peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." It is virtually certain that parts of the world now free would be under Communist control. It is absolutely certain that we would disastrously lack the solid information on Soviet missile-nuclear capabilities which we now have, thanks to the CIA-created U-2 and reconnaissance satellites. If Mr. Truman had not been wiser than he remembers being, we would be today like the only blindfolded man in a murderous game of blindman's buff.

Stewart Alsop

LIEB

MAR 6 1964

EDITORIALS

Let's Stop Baiting the CIA

Last October a Central Intelligence Agency man in Saigon got his name in the papers, lost his cover and had to be transferred. This incident, together with an uneasy feeling that the CIA was working at cross-purposes with the State Department, precipitated a wave of criticism both in the press and in Congress. It was not the first such wave. The CIA has always made many Americans uncomfortable because some of its activities—such as covert operations—are by nature contrary to the U.S. tradition of candor and nonintervention in international affairs. And the CIA is peculiarly vulnerable to critics because it cannot answer them without risking that very secrecy. Anyway, who likes spooks?

Senator Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.) and Congressman John Lindsay (R., N.Y.) are among the CIA's new-wave critics, accusing it of being inadequately controlled and making its own foreign policy. "It has taken on the character of an invisible government answering only to itself," says McCarthy. "This must stop."

Is the CIA in fact out of control? Senator Thomas Dodd (D., Conn.), one of its defenders, calls the charge "patently ridiculous." By statute, the CIA is answerable to the National Security Council and the President, hence it cannot "make its own foreign policy" but only execute the President's, if the President is on the job. Similarly, abroad: the CIA's agents are responsible to our ambassadors and, as George Kennan testified on his return from Belgrade, "The authority of an ambassador over official American personnel within his territory is just about whatever he wants to make it . . . they have to respect his authority if he insists."

Moreover, the CIA is controlled by Congress as well, through three small but elite subcommittees—one in the Senate, two in the House. Members testify that CIA Director McCone or his deputies report regularly and frankly to them. But critics claim this is inadequate and demand a new joint Senate-House watch-

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dog committee, similar to the one that keeps tabs on the secret-laden Atomic Energy Commission. This watchdog proposal was thoroughly debated in 1956 and turned down by the Senate, 59-27. Although the then Senator John F. Kennedy voted with the minority, as President he opposed any added scrutiny of the CIA, as had Eisenhower. The arguments today are much the same as in 1956, and in our opinion a vote would—and should—turn out about the same. As Dodd says, the watchdog committee idea is a mechanical question of "third-rate importance." Even with the watchdog committee, nonmember congressmen would still be largely in the dark about some CIA activities, and would therefore have just as much reason to beef about its secrecy as they do now.

"Khrushchev knows more about the CIA than I do," complained a California congressman. So what? He knows a lot less than he would if Congress knew more.

The CIA has had its successes and its failures in support of U.S. foreign policy, among the former being its role in the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran and of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala a decade ago. Its reputation still suffers from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Yet the plan the CIA authored—a beachhead for an

exile Cuban government that could be supported militarily—looks pretty good in retrospect. The blame for its calamitous execution must be shared by the CIA and the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House. In any case we shall need the capability for that kind of clandestine operation so long as the Communists continue to set the pace for it.

Even more will we continue to need what constitutes most of the CIA's job—the collection and evaluation of intelligence, some secret and some not. That kind of evaluated knowledge, though it cannot be measured or priced, is power. The CIA puts this power at the disposal of the U.S. government. Although no organ of government can or should be exempt from public scrutiny in a democracy, an agency like the CIA can at least ask that such secrecy as is essential to its function be respected and that its contributions to our security be weighed in the same scale as its indispensable (if unpopular) immunities. By that scale, in our judgment, the CIA to date deserves the confidence of the nation.

MAR 6 1964

NEW YORK
JOURNAL AMERICAN

March 20, 1964

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THE 'QUESTIONABLES'

A Secret List Of State Dept. Security Risks

By GUY RICHARDS

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There is a list of 847 grave security risks in the State Department.

It includes the names of pro-Reds, pinks, homosexuals, alcoholics, sex degenerates and a score of well-behaved and well-disciplined individuals suspected of being professional Communist agents.

The last are the hard-core Reds.

Many of the others are believed to be the agents' stooges or dupes.

This veritable social register of subversives and ineligibles is a legacy from the grave of the late Scott McLeod.

For four years before he was appointed Ambassador to Ireland in 1957, Mr. McLeod was the controversial boss of the State Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

After Mr. McLeod left for Dublin in July, 1957, different spokesmen for State either claimed there "never was such a list" or that "Mr. McLeod must have kept it to himself and taken it with him."

Both versions are wrong. This reporter can reveal to day.

SLIGHT ATTRITION

The list is very much alive. Death and attrition have exacted only a small toll on it.

The original, on white bond paper, and two copies on faded onionskin, are in safe-keeping in the Washington, D.C. area.

A safe deposit vault preserves the original. The two copies are each in a different place.

They are a testament to the foresight and sense of foreboding which led Mr. McLeod to turn them over to trusted friends in the Spring of 1957.

MEMORABLE SCENE

The occasion was memorable, informal, grim. The scene was in a private office in downtown Washington.

The 43-year-old, crewcut, bespectacled Iowa-born official slowly and meaningfully waved the hefty handful of documents in front of him. Then Mr. McLeod, a square-shouldered former Grinnell College football player said:

"Some day these pages may be of great importance."

"Some day" they may prove that not everyone in this national capital was asleep. Keep them in separate places. Then at least one copy can outlive any one or two of us.

"You or I can decide when they ought to be taken out and shown to the right people."

That time has come, in the opinion of the heirs of the legacy.

News that McLeod's "List of Questionables" had been preserved intact was privately circulated yesterday on Capitol Hill to members of a few Congressional committees. To report that it caused a stir would Michal Goleniewski.



SCOTT MCLEOD

List of Risks Lives On
AP Photo

be a serious under-statement. The onrush of events made the timing of the McLeod heirs almost inevitable.

Only this week State removed the last six members of Mr. McLeod's investigation-and-evaluation team from security to another bureau. With Otto Otepka already booted out of security work, it represented a complete erasure of all traces of the scent of the tough McLeod.

Mr. McLeod died of a heart attack, at the age of 47, on Nov. 7, 1961, in Concord, N. H.

Two other time-squeezes are pressing on the heirs of the McLeod legacy. One is coming from the direction of the two most famous recent defectors from the Soviet Secret Police, Yuri I. Nossenko and Lt. Col. Michal Goleniewski.

Continued

UNDER TIGHT WRAPS

Both are tightly under the wing of the Central Intelligence Agency, a part of the executive branch.

Both have been reliably reported to the McLeod heirs as having come up with the names of traitorous Americans, some of whom were put on the McLeod list seven, eight or nine years ago.

Convergence of all lists on the same culprits could bring a devastating blow and an antiseptic cleanup to Secretary of State Rusk's department.

POLITICAL SQUEEZE

The other time-squeeze is on the political front. The national conventions and the Presidential campaign are just around the corner. Already two bills have been introduced in Congress calling for a top-to-bottom probe of State. Several Congressional committees are in-or planning to get in the act.

Mr. McLeod's heirs say it's to avoid having the issue become a political football that they hope to bring Democrats and Republicans together in the national interest to act now in a clean-up of State.

They point out it is only if they fail now that all the leverage would go to the Republicans in the upcoming, highly political, Summer and Fall.

Then—and only then—would the issue become a political football.

One of the onionskin copies of McLeod's "List of questionables," this reporter is able to testify, has been kept updated over the years.

Where death or retirement or expulsion or other causes have rendered a name void of any further interest, it has either been scratched or new notes added.

The owner of this particular copy has conferred with me. He is not in the State Dept. Since the latter's "Biographical Register" is several months from its last printing, it is not clear to him, he said, about the present status of all the 847 names.

Here are some of the more interesting cases from those onionskin sheets:

Case of the Security Officer

The Security officer in our embassy at Moscow fell under the spell of a pretty woman KGB agent. She lured him to an apartment equipped with a hidden camera and recording device. He was photographed, in the nude and his voice put on a sound-track.

Russians approached him with their evidence and tried to make a spy out of him. In this they failed. But what floored him and his superiors was the long dossier on his personal history which the Russians recited to him. It included one long-before and almost innocent incident when he got into a minor altercation in a Washington night club, an incident which never even became a police blotter entry.

Apparently the Russians had him tabbed for years as a great blackmail prospect. He was transferred from Moscow. His present status is unclear.

Case of the Bisexual Swain

A senior foreign service officer in Mexico City conducted such a torrid affair with the wife of a French diplomat that it became the subject of official protest through channels. The officer was censured.

Not many months later, in a different city, he was found involved in an equally torrid affair with a South American statesman a man who only recently completed his tour as president of his country.

The American was asked to resign but he demurred. He claimed that few U.S. diplomats had as many strong bonds in the international set as he. It is unknown, at this date, whether the American has resigned or whether he appealed successfully to higher authorities to save him.

Case of the Budapest Carouser

A high foreign service officer in Budapest, Hungary, had an insatiable taste for liquor and girls at the fashional Duna Bar. KGB deployed some of

its own woman agents to his table. Often one would be seen taking him gingerly in tow and bleary-eyed.

One night, completely in the nude he staggered out on a street near the Duna. A photographer was there. It became a police incident requiring diplomatic intercession. Present status unclear.

Old Warsaw Hand

A foreign service officer was more than slightly involved in the case of "E. S." a diplomat found to have been spying for the Russians for 18 years.

"E. S." was made to resign from his post in Warsaw. But the second man, involved in the same case, was simply transferred to a post in Canada. He is there now, ruling on visas of Canadians and Europeans wishing to come to the U. S.

Buenos Aires Questionable

A high official in our embassy in Buenos Aires—and there right now—has a record of Communist affiliation going back 20 years.

Hong Kong Envoy

A Congressman, a writer and a Catholic priest are all on record as reporting—in response to inquiries—that a senior foreign service officer recently stationed in Hong Kong is a practicing homosexual and an embarrassing nuisance to the country he represents.

So goes the list, ad infinitum.

It also records the findings of Mr. McLeod that the department long had been a favored sanctuary for male sex deviates of all sorts, dating back to the days when many principal officers of the department were notorious homosexuals, and thus especially sensitive to Red blackmail. Mr. McLeod's regime obtained the resignation of nearly 900 homosexuals.

SMALL PERCENTAGE

But the possessors of the list also believe that the de-

partment has an overwhelming majority of talented and dedicated Americans and that they, as well as their countrymen, would benefit if the long-forestalled cleansing of State could be rushed to completion.

After all, they point out, 847 minus the attrition figure—represents only about 6 per cent of the 7,000 employees in Washington, and 7,000 foreign service workers abroad, or grand total of 14,000, who are subject to the department's security screen.

They feel it is high time for all concerned that the Questionables be given their day in court and then—if they think it—a fast escort to the exit door.

That means the Questionables List would make an excellent subpoena list for Congress. Start, say, with the names which happen to be those also picked out for signal honors by Nossenko and Goleniewski!

Or won't the executive branch ever let anyone else know who the defectors named?

NEW YORK
JOURNAL AMERICAN

MAR 21 1964

DEVIATES OF ALL TYPES RECRUITED AS SPIES

Soviet Strategy: Use the
'Weak' to Bury U.S.

By GUY RICHARDS

In our Cold War face-off with the Soviet Union, so much attention is devoted to the Reds' army, navy and nuclear strength that their best hidden play is getting scant attention.

It's the astute Russian scheme to make us use our own weaknesses to destroy ourselves.

It's a sort of do-it-yourself destruction kit, lovingly wrapped and packaged in the Kremlin and embossed with a slogan that's surefire in the American market: Absolutely no effort for you—just snip the ribbon!"

All Weaknesses That
Flesh Is Heir To

The scheme is far less costly than any military invasion of the United States.

The tip-off comes from the gallery of Americans which the Soviet Secret Police recently pressed into service as spies.

Venality, homosexuality, al-

coholism, self-pity, wounded pride, obsession with sex, a sense of racial inferiority, a fear of blackmail, an urge to strike back at persecutors real or imaginary—traces of them all can be found in the ready responses of American dupes to the bait the Russians used to win them over.

The import goes far beyond the narrow circle of the espionage racket.

There are broad hints coming from many other directions that the Reds plan to bury us by using the same kind of bait on a much more massive but subtle scale on the theory that our composite national character will fall for it.

Could they be right? The Germans thought this

was a sound theory in the early days of World War I, but history proved they miscalculated.

They and their Axis allies thought the theory had even greater validity in the early days of World War II, but once more it was a miscalculation.

The Chinese Reds were even surer of it in 1950, as far as it applied to Korea, but this time the miscalculation was by no means as great as the others. With spiked guns, sheathed swords, and United Nations-imposed bomblines, we settled for limited objectives and muddled agreements.

In the cases of Castro's Cuba, South Viet Nam, and Panama, the fuzz is getting thicker than thistledowns in August as to how much firm resolve we intend to put behind any clearly defined goals whatsoever.

Who could blame the Communists, then, either in Peking or Moscow, for be-

ieving that the total drift of the American people may be towards the same general direction taken by the Americans who turned to spying?

For Nelson Drummond, the old Navy man, it started out with liquor and an incurable taste for the fleshpots.

For Sgt. Jack E. Dunlap, the old Army man, it was pretty much the same thing.

For Irwin C. Scarbeck, the diplomat in our Warsaw Embassy, a man with a wife and children, it was an uncontrollable susceptibility to the haunting voice and figure of dark-eyed Urszula Discher.


22.

For the two defectors from the National Security Agency—Euron F. Mitchell and Williams H. Martin—it was that puzzling malaise of modern society, homosexuality.

Susceptibilities Are
Varied and Many

For the American servicemen who were gathered into the vortex of that perfumed Tobacco Road presided over by Christine Keeler and her friends in London, and watched closely by the Soviet Union's Capt. Eugene Ivanov, it was another American vice which can prove as perilous as any—sheer naivete.

Put them all together, and whirl them around as the planners in Moscow, Peking, and Havana are constantly doing. Do you get a blend of national character which is



NEW CITIES... They mark the spots where Soviet Secret Police agents have successfully dangled

bait before potential American recruits, based on the latter's known weaknesses.

Continued

steadily deteriorating on
trails blazed by our turn-
coats?

Apparently the Reds think
so and are betting their for-
eign policy on it.

Whether they are right or
wrong will prove to be the
riddle of our lifetime.

It's a riddle which can
never be resolved without
taking note that in our stand
against the Communists,
two worlds, each with a split
personality, are arrayed
against each other.

The Russians are basically
Puritans who, on behalf of
their country, will stoop to
the nastiest forms of de-
pravity to enlist spies bent on
our obstruction.

The Americans are basically
self-indulgent, pleasure-lov-
ing people, who will rise to
the greatest heights of brav-
ery and sacrifice when we
know we are threatened.

Obviously, then, it's going
to be much easier to lick us
when we don't know.

RIVERSIDE, CAL.
ENTERPRISE

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Front Page

Edit Page

Other Page

Date: FEB 27 1964

Riverside

WHAT WASN'T SAID

Editor, the Press and Enterprise:

It was very interesting to read the item which appeared on the front page of The Press on Wednesday, Feb. 19: "Mrs. Oswald insists son in CIA employ." What made the item even more interesting was what it did NOT say.

According to the news item, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, the mother of the accused assassin of President Kennedy, is now on a cross-country speaking tour and made the claim that her son was somehow in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency at a meeting held in Town Hall, New York.

What's so interesting about that? The news item stated that the meeting was sponsored by the publication, National Guardian Progressive News Weekly.

Now for the punch line. If you will refer to the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" prepared and released by the Committee on Un-

American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., dated Dec. 1, 1961, you will find on Page 193:

NATIONAL GUARDIAN: 1. "Established by the American Labor party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

My question is this: If Lee Harvey Oswald was in the employ of the CIA—which no one in his right mind believes—then who is Mrs. Oswald working for?

JULIUS E. BERNSTEIN

Riverside

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

The Dangerous Game of Baiting the CIA

SPEECH
OF
HON. THOMAS J. DODD
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, February 17, 1964

Mr. DODD. Madam President, I have been disturbed, as I am sure many of my colleagues have been, by the virtual epidemic of attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency in recent months.

Some of these attacks have clearly been the product of irresponsible and speculative news reporting by men who are more concerned with the headline value of something that smacks of sensation or scandal than they are with the security of the country.

But there have also been attacks, or sharp criticisms, by commentators of national reputation who are generally careful about their facts but who have apparently been impressed by some of the rumors and stories and inaccuracies which seem to have become credible because they have been repeated so often.

There have also been attacks on the CIA by distinguished Members of Congress which seem to me exaggerated and without foundation. These men are friends of mine, whom I respect and who are greatly respected by the country. Their views are very influential and because of this I feel an obligation to make reply to some criticisms which I feel are unwarranted.

Baiting the CIA almost seems to have achieved the stature of a popular national pastime.

It is a highly dangerous pastime because the CIA is one of the essential elements of our security.

There is also something unbecoming about the pastime, because the CIA cannot defend itself. Attacking the CIA, indeed, is something like beating a man who has his arms tied behind his back. For reasons of national security, the Agency cannot confirm or deny published reports, true or false, favorable or unfavorable. It cannot alibi. It cannot explain. It cannot answer even the most outrageously inaccurate charges.

It was to this situation that President Kennedy addressed himself when he spoke to the CIA personnel at their headquarters in Langley, Va., on November 28, 1961.

Your successes are unheralded—

Said President Kennedy—

Your failures are trumpeted. * * * But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is—and, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged. So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I am confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.

The charges that have been made against the CIA in recent months are almost as numerous as they are sensational.

We have been told that the CIA has been running wild, that it has been functioning without control or supervision either by Congress or the administration, that it has been making foreign policy.

The CIA has been criticized for the U-2 overflight.

It has been blamed for the Bay of Pigs disaster.

And it has even been criticized for the anti-Mossadegh coup in Iran and for the overthrow of the pro-Communist Arbenz government in Guatemala.

Whether the critics realize it or not, these charges also constitute an attack on the wisdom and integrity of both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy. It is tantamount to accusing them of passively allowing an executive agency to function without control or supervision, and to make foreign policy—in other words, to usurp the President's own authority. This is patently ridiculous. Neither President would ever have permitted such a thing.

I propose to say a few words about some of these charges.

I feel that I am in a position to do so, because in the course of my travels around Europe, Asia, and Africa, I have come to know many of the CIA's field representatives, and, from long conversations with them, I have some appreciation, I believe, of the work they do. In addition, I know something of the headquarters operation because senior officers of the Agency have on a number of occasions appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and have given testimony of vital significance.

If the overall quality of an agency may be judged from the quality of the men who compose it, then the CIA would have to be given a triple A rating. I have never encountered in any Government agency a body of men whose ability and dedication impressed me more.

Perhaps the most popular charge directed against the CIA is that it operates completely without congressional oversight or supervision. It is this charge that has given rise to the clamor for a congressional watchdog committee.

This charge is totally and demonstrably untrue. Indeed, the CIA is probably one of the most supervised agencies in the Government.

In both the House and Senate there are special subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee and of the Appropriations Committee that oversee the activities of CIA.

In the House these subcommittees are headed by Representatives CARL VINSON and CLARENCE CANNON; in the Senate they are headed by Senator RUSSELL and SENATOR HAYDEN. These men are among the most knowledgeable and conscientious legislators our Nation has produced; and I, for one, am willing to abide by their judgment on matters which, for reasons of security, cannot be revealed to all Members of Congress.

The Director of the CIA and the chairman of the House and Senate subcommittees have frequent meetings during the course of the year. The subcommittees are advised and fully informed of special or unusual activities. They are also informed upon the receipt of significant intelligence.

In 1963, the Director of Central Intelligence or his deputy, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, appeared before congressional committees on some 30 occasions. In addition to briefings of the CIA subcommittees in the House and Senate, these appearances included briefings on subjects of special interest to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, and other committees.

I recall the clamor that immediately arose when our U-2 plane was shot down over Soviet territory in May of 1960. Many people jumped to the conclusion that the CIA had been operating on its own, without the authorization of President or Congress. The U-2 flights were charged with endangering the security of the Nation, when, in fact, they had de-

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fended us against the possibility of a surprise missile attack.

President Eisenhower put an end to the speculation about the lack of Executive authorization by informing the press that he had personally approved the U-2 program. Unfortunately, it did not receive quite as much attention when Representative CANNON on May 10 rose to inform the House that the House subcommittee was fully apprised of the project, had approved it, and had recommended the funds for it.

Let me quote his words on that occasion, because I think they constitute an adequate response to all those who, in ignorance of the facts, still charge that the CIA operates without congressional supervision.

This is what Representative CANNON said:

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

It seems to me that what some Members of Congress have been complaining about in advocating a joint congressional watchdog committee is that they have been unaware of certain activities conducted by the CIA. But the information gathered by CIA and the activities conducted by it must, of necessity, be confined to a careful selected and re-

stricted committee. If this information were made available to all Members of Congress, the security essential for national defense would cease to exist.

The Members of Congress are all trustworthy; but a secret ceases to be a secret when it is shared by more than 500 people.

Even if a joint congressional watchdog committee were established, it would have to observe the same rules of secrecy that today govern the activities of the House and Senate subcommittee; and those Members of Congress who today complain that they do not know what the CIA is doing, would still find that they know precious little about it. Which, I may say, is the way things ought to be.

Whether or not a joint committee of Congress could more effectively supervise the activities of the CIA than the House and Senate subcommittee now in existence is a purely mechanical question which I frankly consider to be of a third-rate importance. This proposal appears to be based on the false assumption that the CIA has engaged in unauthorized activities. It also casts doubt upon the competence and dedication of the distinguished Members of the House and Senate who now serve on the two subcommittees.

As for the oft-repeated charge that even the President does not know what the CIA is doing, let me quote a few paragraphs from the National Security Act of 1947, under which the Central Intelligence Agency was established:

There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof.

The National Security Act further provides in section 102(d):

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the

duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security * * *;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

The text of any piece of legislation makes dry reading, but I have gone to the trouble of reading these paragraphs of the National Security Act for the record because they repeatedly make it clear that the CIA functions under the direction of the National Security Council, and as an arm of the National Security Council.

They also make it abundantly clear that the CIA was to have duties broader than the simple gathering of intelligence data, operating under the direction of the National Security Council.

The wording of the National Security Act was a reflection of the growing recognition that we cannot compete with communism if we confine ourselves to orthodox diplomacy and orthodox intelligence collection.

Over and over and over again, it has been demonstrated that a handful of trained Communists can seize control of a trade union or a student federation, or for that matter, of a country. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the people are non-Communists or anti-Communists has, in most such situations, not seriously impeded them because the

opposition generally lacks organization, lacks know-how, lacks discipline, lacks funds.

In every country that has been taken over by the Communists or that has been menaced by Communist takeover, there have always been men of understanding and of courage who are prepared to risk their lives for freedom. There have been situations, and there will, I am certain, be situations in the future, in which some sound advice plus some limited assistance in the form of funds, or even arms, may make the difference between victory or defeat for the forces of freedom.

If we are not prepared to give this assistance to those who share our beliefs, then we might as well run up the flag of surrender today: because it can be predicted as a certainty that the Communists will move without serious opposition from one triumph to another.

I do not propose to draw up a scorecard of CIA victories and CIA defeats. I do not know for certain whether they played any role in the uprising that overthrew the pro-Communist government of President Arbenz in Guatemala. Nor do I know whether the Agency was in any way connected with the overthrow of the lunatic Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953. But I would like to discuss these two events because I consider them to be outstanding examples of the kind of perilous situation I have just described.

In the case of Guatemala, the Arbenz government, which had been elected on a nationalist and reform program, was moving, in a manner later to be emulated by Castro, toward the complete communization of the country. As the government introduced more radical measures, it lost its hold over the people and over the armed forces. But the regime would not have toppled had it not been for the courageous action of a handful of patriots under Col. Castillo Armas,

who invaded Guatemala from Honduras in 1954.

When this small band of determined patriots established themselves on Guatemalan soil, the Arbenz regime collapsed like a house of cards. Hardly a shot was fired in its defense, so completely without support was it among the people and among the Guatemalan armed forces.

A similar situation existed in Iran under Mossadegh in 1953. Mossadegh had come to power as a Nationalist. But his nationalism was of the lunatic variety that was prepared to give carte blanche to the Communists in return for their support. Had he remained in power another year, it is probable that today Iran would be on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

In August 1953, mass demonstrations against the Mossadegh regime erupted in Teheran. Within 48 hours, the regime had been swept out of power, the Communist Tudeh Party had been crushed, and wildly cheering throngs hailed the return of the young Shah to his throne.

If the CIA did have a role to play in Guatemala and Iran, then it played its role successfully. It inflicted two great defeats on the Communists and thereby saved two vital countries from slipping into the Communist orbit. Is this something we should apologize for? No, on the contrary, it is something of which every American should be proud.

There are some people who would have us place an absolute prohibition on any form of assistance to the forces of freedom in other countries in the name of "nonintervention."

Some of these are of the absolute pacifist variety, who would rather let the Communists take over the world than fight against them.

Others are muddleheaded moralists, who might be willing to fight if their own country were threatened by a Com-

unist takeover, who are prepared to admit that the Communists engage in massive subversive activities of every kind, but who, for some strange reason, consider it wrong for the United States to do anything about it.

At least a few of the critics of the CIA's operations are unquestionably fellow travelers and Communists.

What is most damaging and most perplexing, however, is the criticism that comes from Members of Congress who are staunch anti-Communists, who do not believe that the United States should stand by, indifferent and supine, while the Communists proceed to take over in other countries, but who, nevertheless, argue that the CIA should not have an operational function. They say that if the United States is to conduct operations designed to meet the Soviet subversive threat, this should be done by a separate agency.

Once the need for clandestine operations is conceded, I frankly do not see the importance of the argument that they should be conducted by a separate agency. In either case, the United States would still be involved in the business of covert operations which so disturbs the ultramoralist critics of the CIA. From a strictly practical standpoint, moreover, I believe that grave harm would be done by separating the conduct of clandestine operations from the careful processing of intelligence which must govern such operations.

It may disturb some people, but I think it can be stated as a certainty that many countries that remain free today would not be free if it had not been for the CIA.

The U-2 flights which the CIA conducted with such outstanding success for some 4 years before the shooting down of Gary Powers also disturbed some of our ultramoralists. But I think that the vast majority of the American people take great pride in the knowledge

that we had been able to penetrate Soviet secrecy.

The CIA has been attacked from many different directions for the role it played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I am not saying that the CIA is blameless or that it has made no errors. But I do oppose what appears to be a mounting tendency to shift all the blame for the Bay of Pigs disaster onto the much abused head of the CIA, because the record made it clear that many people shared the blame.

Essentially, it failed because we had not made the decision that it must not be permitted to fail.

This is the position I took in speaking on the floor of the Senate on April 24, 1961, hard on the heels of the disaster; and since that time and up to this minute, no information has been adduced which would lead me to revise this position.

The propaganda campaign against the CIA reached a crescendo during the recent Vietnamese crisis. Last October 4, an article written by a correspondent for an American newspaper chain charged that the CIA had been subverting State Department policy in Vietnam, and that John Richardson, the CIA man in Saigon, had openly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Lodge.

The correspondent who wrote this article was guilty of openly identifying a CIA representative abroad, thus reducing, if not destroying, his potential usefulness forever. Visiting Congressmen and members of the press may sometimes know the identity of the CIA representative, but it has been taken for granted that they do not reveal his identity to the public.

To the best of my knowledge, this was the first instance in which an American correspondent has been guilty of this flagrant breach of the ethics of security.

Moreover, these sweeping charges against an important agency of the Gov-

ernment, and against a man's integrity, were obviously based on a one-sided presentation from some official source. Mr. Richardson and the CIA could not defend themselves. I have always taken it for granted that American newspapermen in any controversial situation endeavor to obtain the facts from both sides, and all the more so when such sweeping accusations are involved. Not only have I taken it for granted, but it is also true what the vast majority of our newspapermen do. But the correspondent in question apparently considered this unnecessary.

In the third place, the charges against Mr. Richardson were a tissue of falsehoods. President Kennedy, when he was asked about the charges against the CIA and Mr. Richardson at his press conference of October 12 said:

I must say I think the reports are wholly untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr. [CIA Director John] McCone sits in the National Security Council. I imagine I see him at least three or four times a week, ordinarily. We have worked very closely together in the National Security Council in the last 2 months attempting to meet the problems we face in South Vietnam. I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last 9 months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA had done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. I know that the transfer of Mr. John Richardson [CIA official in Saigon] who is a very dedicated public servant has led to surmises, but I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the co-operation of the National Security Council and under my instructions.

So I think while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job.

President Kennedy's characterization of Mr. Richardson, I can wholeheartedly endorse from my personal knowledge of Mr. Richardson. In most countries I have visited, the briefings by CIA representatives have been limited to an hour or two. But in May 1961, when I was in the Far East, Richardson briefed me for some 7 or 8 hours, all told. Certainly, it was the most detailed, most balanced, most knowledgeable briefing I have ever been given. But I was even more impressed by Mr. Richardson as a man than by his exceptional competence as an intelligence officer. Indeed, of all the hundreds of people in the American service whom I have met in the course of my travels through Europe, Africa, and Asia, I can recall no one for whom I formed a higher esteem than John Richardson.

There is a final word I wish to say in this connection. It is clear that the article in question originated in some official source. It had to. The official who was guilty of giving out this story to the press was himself guilty of violating the rules of security as well as the ethics that should govern relations between government departments. This officer, in my opinion, should be identified and dismissed.

The time has come when Members of Congress and members of the press must take stock of the growing campaign against CIA and of the part they themselves may have played in forwarding this campaign.

I am not suggesting that the CIA should be immune to criticism because of the sensitive nature of its operations. No government agency should be immune from criticism.

I do believe, however, that there has been far too much sensationalism, far

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too many inaccuracies, and far too little concern for the national security in some of the criticism that has heretofore been made of the CIA.

I believe that, before we indulge in criticism of the CIA, we should take into account the fact that it cannot defend itself. We should also take into account the fact that every critical statement, whether accurate or inaccurate, will be picked up by the special bureau of the Soviet secret police whose task it is to discredit the CIA, and will be put to work through all the information and propaganda channels open to the Kremlin and through all its agents in the world's news media.

Because these things are so, we all share a special responsibility, if we feel constrained to criticize the CIA, to check our facts painstakingly, to weigh our words carefully, and to speak with restraint. If we have questions or complaints, I believe that, before taking them to the mass circulation press, we should discuss them with the Director of the CIA, or his deputy, or with the chairmen of the four House and Senate committees charged with the supervision of the CIA's activities. And if, after checking in this manner, there is any one of us who still considers it necessary to speak out against certain policies of the CIA, the proper place to do it would be on the floor of Congress rather than on television, or through the mass circulation periodicals. This would provide an opportunity for rebuttal and debate, and the press accounts, hopefully, would reflect all sides of the discussion.

For whatever its errors and shortcomings may be, I believe, with President Kennedy, that the CIA will in the future continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as it has in the past.

SATURDAY EVENING
POST

FEB 15 1964

Hogwash about the CIA



CIA's McCone

WASHINGTON: In all fairness, it is time somebody had a kind word to say for the poor old Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA is rather like the boy in school who always gets slapped around because everybody knows he won't hit back.

The State Department has slapped the CIA hard for "invading the policy-making field," on the grounds that the agency briefed some newspapermen on the sad state of the Soviet economy. A lot of the press has also been slapping the CIA around, and a few highly respectable journals have even half-echoed the Communist *Worker's* charge that Lee Harvey Oswald, murderer of President Kennedy, went to the Soviet Union in 1959 as a CIA hireling.

Former President Harry Truman has got in his licks. "I never had any thought when I set up CIA," he has written, "that it would be injected into the peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." Sen. Eugene McCarthy, in an article recently published in this magazine [Jan. 4-11], has charged that the CIA is getting out of hand. Neither the President nor the Congress, the senator maintains, really controls the agency or knows what it is up to.

Somebody certainly blundered when the CIA held a mass press conference on the Soviet economy, and let reporters name the agency as their source. But with all due respect to a former President and an able senator, the other charges against CIA are a lot of hogwash. Let us consider them, in order.

First, Lee Harvey Oswald never at any time had any connection whatever with CIA, although suspicions on that score are perhaps natural in view of the mystery surrounding Oswald's travels and his sources of income. The highest officials of the CIA are ready to so testify—and indignantly—before the Warren Commission investigating the murder. "If anybody in the CIA had hired so obvious a psychotic," says one of the greatest experts in the intelligence business, "he should have been fired on the spot."

Second, the odd fact is that Harry S. Truman himself put the CIA into the "peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." The CIA's operational, or cloak-and-dagger, unit was established by President Truman's National Security Council in the summer of 1948, after the Communists grabbed Czechoslovakia. In the subsequent four and a half years, before President Truman stepped down, certain highly effective secret operations were mounted with the President's full knowledge and approval.

Third, the notion that neither Congress nor the President controls the agency or knows what it is doing is nonsense. The CIA is unquestionably the most supervised agency in the Government—dozens of people spend much of their time breathing down its neck.

The neck-breathers include four subcommittees of Congress, headed by Representatives Carl Vinson and Clarence Cannon and Senators Richard Russell and Carl Hayden. These congressional grandees are acutely jealous of congressional prerogatives, and they are not about to let any executive agency, in Senator McCarthy's words, "[decide] for itself just how much or how little Congress ought to know."

Neither CIA director John McCone nor his predecessor, Allen Dulles, when meeting in closed session, ever refused a candid answer to any question. To cite one example, contrary to the popular mythology, the four subcommittees were thoroughly briefed on the U-2 operation virtually from its inception.

By the same token, ever since Mr. Truman established the operational section, every President has been thoroughly informed of every important secret operation. And every President has had, and sometimes exercised, an absolute veto power over any operation. When there have been disputes on major policy matters between the CIA and the State Department or the Pentagon, the last word in the argument has always been the President's. Again contrary to the popular mythology, President Eisenhower personally authorized the U-2 flight which Khrushchev used to break up the 1960 summit meeting.

Moreover, the President has plenty of help in keeping an eye on the agency. For example, a blue-ribbon presidential board, headed by former White House counsel Clark Clifford, is charged with continuous supervision of the agency. And there are all sorts of special committees, like that headed by Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, with responsibility in the field of subversion and guerrilla warfare.

It is just plain silly, in short, to suppose that the CIA is "a law unto itself." The real danger is that the CIA will become a vast cautious bureaucracy, bound by the lowest common denominator of timidity among its innumerable supervisors. The CIA in any case spends less than a third of the money and "owns" less than a quarter of the people in the intelligence business. The Pentagon intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, spend most of the money and own most of the people, but nobody seems interested in supervising them.

Continued



Harry S. Truman



Sen. Eugene McCarthy

The NSA particularly could do with a bit of supervision. It has a horrible security record. Recent cases include a couple of homosexuals who defected to the Soviet Union and spilled all the beans; and an Army sergeant who collected \$50,000 from Russian agents for really important American secrets, and spent the loot in the most conspicuous possible way on mistresses, motor yachts and the like. If the CIA had been responsible for either case, there would have been a hullabaloo to make the Alger Hiss case seem tame.

In fact, the CIA has not yet suffered a single known defection or penetration, which is better than par for the course. Certainly there are time-servers in the agency, and certainly it has had its failures, in the Bay of Pigs and elsewhere.

But those who enjoy slapping the CIA around ought to ask themselves what might have happened if Mr. Truman had not been wise enough to put CIA into "the peacetime cloak-and-dagger business." It is virtually certain that parts of the world now free would be under Communist control. It is absolutely certain that we would disastrously lack the solid information on Soviet missile-nuclear capabilities which we now have, thanks to the CIA-created U-2 and reconnaissance satellites. If Mr. Truman had not been wiser than he remembers being, we would be today like the only blindfolded man in a murderous game of blindman's buff.

Stu Klop

FEB 15 1964